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NUCLEAR POWER AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
GREEN FUEL: WHY UPRATES TO 
COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTORS 
DESERVE TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR FEDERAL 
LOAN GUARANTEES, AND WHY THE 
DOE’S DECISION TO MAKE THEM SO 
WARRANTS CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
MARISA P. KALEY* 
Abstract: Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the “Act”) authorizes 
the Department of Energy (“DOE”) to provide loan guarantees to nuclear en-
ergy projects that avoid, reduce, or sequester greenhouse gas emissions while 
employing new or significantly improved technology. The agency’s decision 
to include uprates—projects that increase the amount of power an existing re-
actor produces—among those nuclear projects that may apply for a loan guar-
antee should survive a legal challenge under the deferential standard laid out 
in Chevron. A court should defer to the DOE’s interpretation of the Act be-
cause Congress failed to express its unambiguous intent regarding which 
types of projects qualify for the program, and the agency’s interpretation re-
flects a permissible construction of the statute. Consistent with Congress’s 
goal of combating global warming and climate change, the DOE’s interpreta-
tion of Title XVII encourages the growth of America’s commercial nuclear 
capacity in an effort to reduce reliance on fossil fuels to generate electricity. 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) estimates that 
America’s demand for electricity will increase almost thirty percent be-
tween 2012 and 2040.1 Although natural gas will account for seventy-three 
                                                                                                                           
 * Senior Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–
2016. 
 1 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 
WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at MT-16 (2014) [hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014], 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf [http://perma.cc/3HZR-CJGV]. The EIA is the 
statistical and analytical agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. About EIA Mission and 
Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/about/mission_overview.cfm [http://
perma.cc/DK3W-5VXG]. Despite increasingly efficient appliances and equipment, electricity usage 
is forecast to grow at just under 1% a year due primarily to increased commercial and residential 
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percent of the increase in electricity generation, nuclear power will make up 
only three percent of the additional capacity.2 Some policymakers, however, 
seek to increase America’s reliance on nuclear power, a more environmen-
tally friendly energy source, by providing federal loan guarantees to private 
companies as an incentive to undertake new nuclear projects.3 
Unlike power plants that burn coal, oil, or natural gas to generate elec-
tricity, nuclear plants do not release any carbon dioxide as a by-product of 
the generation process.4 To the extent that nuclear power is a “clean” energy 
source, it is an attractive alternative to fossil fuels.5 On the other hand, the 
costs associated with bringing a new nuclear power plant online and contin-
ued operation of existing plants present an obstacle to wider use.6 This is 
where policymakers hope a federal loan guarantee program can be useful.7 
Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the “Act”) provides an 
avenue for the growth of America’s commercial nuclear power industry, and 
correspondingly our reliance on it, by providing financial incentives for 
new environmentally friendly energy technology.8 Title XVII authorizes the 
                                                                                                                           
demand as people move to warmer climates that require more cooling. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2014, supra. 
 2 ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014, supra note 1, at MT-17. 
 3 See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Obama Administration Announces 
Loan Guarantees to Construct New Nuclear Power Reactors in Georgia (Feb. 16, 2010), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/obama-administration-announces-loan-guarantees-construct-
new-nuclear-power-reactors [https://perma.cc/UGP6-24M7]; Air Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGEN-
CY [http://perma.cc/E8DH-V54U] (original hyperlink no longer active); Costs: Fuel, Operation, 
Waste Disposal & Life Cycle, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/
Nuclear-Statistics/Costs-Fuel,-Operation,-Waste-Disposal-Life-Cycle [http://perma.cc/V56U-EJTT]. 
Nuclear power plants do not emit several of the harmful pollutants that are released by plants that 
burn natural gas, coal, or oil, such as carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and methane. 
Air Emissions, supra. 
 4 Air Emissions, supra note 3. Nor do they emit other harmful air pollutants associated with 
burning fossil fuels, including nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide and methane. Id. 
 5 See Environment: Emissions Prevented, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/
Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/Environment-Emissions-Prevented [http://perma.cc/4TVY-
5VDR]. “However, fossil fuel emissions are associated with the uranium mining and uranium en-
richment process as well as the transport of the uranium fuel to the nuclear plant.” Air Emissions, 
supra note 3. 
 6 Infra notes 42–52 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Henry Fountain, Nuclear: Carbon Free, but Not Free of Unease, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/science/nuclear-carbon-free-but-not-free-of-unease-.html
l?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.
nav=top-news&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/KNN6-JWF3]; Nuclear Energy Inst., Comment Letter on 
Department of Energy’s Draft Solicitation for Federal Loan Guarantees for Advanced Nuclear 
Energy Projects (Nov. 3, 2014) [hereinafter NEI Comment Letter] [http://perma.cc/7VK8-RT7T] 
(original hyperlink no longer active); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, supra 
note 3; infra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1701–1704, 119 Stat. 594, 1117–22 
(2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801–16524 (2012)); NEI Comment Letter, supra 
note 7; Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 3. 
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Secretary of the Department of Energy (“Energy Secretary”) to make loan 
guarantees for projects that use innovative technologies to reduce air pollu-
tion or greenhouse gas emissions.9 After making the first round of loan 
guarantees to nuclear projects in 2010, the Department of Energy (“DOE”) 
announced in October 2014 that it was considering a second round of fund-
ing to encourage the expansion of nuclear power.10 In its draft solicitation, 
the DOE indicated that it would allow power uprates—or projects to im-
prove the output of existing nuclear reactors—to apply for loan guaran-
tees.11 
Critics of the loan program accuse the DOE of running afoul of the 
plain language of the Act by advancing an overly broad interpretation of the 
authorizing statute.12 Specifically, detractors argue that uprates cannot quali-
fy for loan guarantees because they cannot satisfy the threshold require-
ments: eligible projects must avoid, reduce, or sequester greenhouse gases 
and also employ new or significantly improved technology.13 
After a public comment period, the DOE announced in December 
2014 that it would proceed with an additional round of loan guarantees for 
nuclear projects worth $12.5 billion.14 The final text of the solicitation re-
tained the draft language making uprates eligible for loan guarantees.15 This 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801(4), 16513(a). 
 10 Agency Request for Comments on Draft Solicitation for Advanced Nuclear Energy Pro-
jects, 79 Fed. Reg. 59763, 59763 (Oct. 3, 2014); Press Release, White House Office of the Press 
Sec’y, supra note 3. 
 11 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, LOAN GUARANTEE SOLICITATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT 2 (2014) [hereinafter DRAFT SOLICITATION], http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
2014/09/f18/Nuclear%20Solicitation%2009%2029%20final%20draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/896C-
5ARQ]. According to the DOE Loan Programs Office, a “solicitation” refers to “a funding oppor-
tunity issued by the DOE for which an applicant is invited to apply.” Glossary of Terms, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, http://energy.gov/lpo/about-us/glossary-terms 
[http://perma.cc/F9YJ-2484]. The process of “uprating” a nuclear reactor refers to modifying an 
existing reactor such that it can produce more thermal energy, which in turn produces more steam, 
which ultimately increases the amount of electricity that can be produced. Background on Power 
Uprates, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.NRC.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/
power-uprates/about-power.html [http://perma.cc/CQW3-H6TH] (last updated Oct. 23, 2014). 
 12 See infra notes 148–181 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 148–181 and accompanying text. 
 14 Agency Request for Comments on Draft Solicitation for Advanced Nuclear Energy Projects, 
79 Fed. Reg. at 59763; Peter W. Davidson, Building an All-of-the-Above Portfolio with Loan Guar-
antees for Advanced Nuclear Projects, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE (Dec. 10, 
2014, 9:00 AM), http://energy.gov/lpo/articles/building-all-above-portfolio-loan-guarantees-
advanced-nuclear-projects [http://perma.cc/EW44-WRPU]. 
 15 Compare U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, LOAN GUARANTEE SOLICITA-
TION ANNOUNCEMENT 2 (2014) [hereinafter FINAL SOLICITATION], 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/05/f22/Advanced-Nuclear-Energy-Projects-Loan-
Guarantee-Solicitation_COMPLETE_22 . . . .pdf [perma.cc/8C5K-XJTF] (“An ‘Eligible Project’ 
under this Solicitation . . . [includes] c) Uprates. Projects consisting of improvements and/or modi-
fications to an existing reactor that is operating but that due to such improvements and/or modifi-
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Note argues that the decision to allow uprates to compete for Title XVII 
loan guarantees is one that is within the power of the DOE to make, and 
should survive a potential challenge pursuant to the Chevron doctrine.16 In 
enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress delegated to the DOE the 
authority to determine which types of projects, across a range of industries, 
would be eligible for loan guarantees.17 In turn, the agency’s decision to 
include uprates among those projects eligible for loan guarantees reflects a 
reasonable interpretation of Title XVII in light of the statutory language and 
the Act’s underlying policy.18 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Nuclear power plants are an attractive alternative to fossil fuel-fired 
plants because they can generate electricity without emitting greenhouse 
gases.19 Once they are up and running, nuclear power plants can compete 
with their fossil fuel counterparts on the pricing of electricity, however, 
building a new plant or updating an existing one can be incredibly expen-
sive.20 In an effort to help plant operators overcome this financial obstacle 
and to encourage the growth of the nation’s commercial nuclear power in-
dustry, Congress has provided assistance in the form of federal loan guaran-
tees for certain new nuclear projects.21 Tasked with distributing the nearly 
twenty billion dollars set aside for nuclear loan guarantees, the DOE is in 
the midst of its second solicitation of applicant projects.22 The DOE’s im-
plementation of the nuclear loan guarantee program benefits from Chevron 
deference.23 
                                                                                                                           
cations will operate more efficiently.”), with DRAFT SOLICITATION, supra note 11, at 2 (“An ‘Eli-
gible Project’ under this Solicitation . . . [includes] c) Uprates. Projects consisting of improve-
ments and/or modifications to an existing reactor that is operating but that due to such improve-
ments and/or modifications will operate more efficiently.”). 
 16 See infra notes 182–267 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 190–210 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 211–267 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Air Emissions, supra note 3. 
 20 See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 42–68 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 69–105 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 106–147 and accompanying text. 
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A. Brief Overview of Commercial Nuclear Power in the United States 
The United States produces more nuclear power than any other coun-
try and accounts for over thirty percent of global generation.24 Of the 
world’s 441 fully operational nuclear reactors, about one hundred are locat-
ed in the United States, nearly double the number operated by France, 
which occupies the number two spot.25 Commercially operated nuclear re-
actors in the United States are “light water” reactors used to generate elec-
tricity, while the remaining “non-power” reactors are used for research and 
training purposes.26 
Nuclear power plants use fission—the splitting of uranium atoms—to 
release energy that is used to make steam, which is ultimately converted to 
electricity.27 The majority of commercial nuclear power plants in the United 
States use pressurized water reactors.28 These reactors rely on a nuclear core 
powered by thousands of uranium rods to heat pressurized water that flows 
into a coolant loop to produce steam.29 The steam is channeled into turbines 
that use the water vapor to produce electricity, and excess steam returns to a 
condenser before passing through the cycle again.30 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Nuclear Power in the USA, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
country-profiles/countries-T-Z/USA—Nuclear-Power/ [perma.cc/KEW5-6X2V] (last updated Dec. 
2015). 
 25 Operational & Long-Term Shutdown Reactors, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 
http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx [perma.cc/3WCX-
WJN4] (last updated Jan. 10, 2016). France currently operates 58 reactors. Id. 
 26 See Backgrounder on Research and Test Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/research-reactors-bg.html [per-
ma.cc/GG2N-6KPY] (last updated Aug. 5, 2015); Power Reactors, U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/power.html [perma.cc/M797-29WU] (last updated Nov. 6, 
2015); What Is a Nuclear Reactor?, EUROPEAN NUCLEAR SOC’Y, http://www.euronuclear.org/1-
information/energy-uses.htm [http://perma.cc/K8K4-9LLG]. Light water reactors use regular 
water (H2O) and heavy water reactors use water that contains a comparatively high proportion of 
heavy hydrogen (or deuterium) atoms to hydrogen atoms. Heavy Water (D20), U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.NRC.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/heavy-water-d2o.html 
[perma.cc/NQ6M-24JJ] (last updated Dec. 17, 2015); Power Reactors, supra. 
 27 Nuclear Energy, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY [http://perma.cc/UMW9-UXSA] (last updat-
ed Sept. 24, 2015) (original hyperlink no longer active). 
 28 Boiling Water Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.NRC.gov/
reactors/bwrs.html [http://perma.cc/X7G6-P48D] (last updated Jan. 15, 2015); How Uranium Ore Is 
Made into Nuclear Fuel, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/
how-is-uranium-ore-made-into-nuclear-fuel-/ [http://perma.cc/R8V8-6HDN]; Power Reactors, supra 
note 26; Pressurized Water Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.NRC.gov/
reactors/pwrs.html [http://perma.cc/H4UG-WFPD] (last updated Jan. 15, 2015). 
 29 How Uranium Ore Is Made into Nuclear Fuel, supra note 28; Power Reactors, supra note 
26; Pressurized Water Reactors, supra note 28. Meanwhile, the 35 boiling water reactors in opera-
tion use a very similar process except the heat from the reactor’s core produces a mixture of steam 
and water, which are then separated and the steam is directed to the turbine generator. Boiling Water 
Reactors, supra note 28; Power Reactors, supra note 26. 
 30 Pressurized Water Reactors, supra note 28. 
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The first commercial nuclear power plant, the Shippingport Atomic 
Power Station in Pennsylvania, started generating electricity in 1957 and 
was retired in 1982.31 America’s nuclear plants, concentrated along the east 
coast and in the Midwest, generate about twenty percent of the nation’s 
electricity (and sixty-three percent of the nation’s electricity from non-
carbon emitting sources).32 Most of these plants were built between 1967 
and 1990, with forty-seven reactors receiving approval before 1977 but not 
coming online until the late 1970s and 1980s.33 There was no construction 
of new nuclear power plants between 1977 and 2013, due largely to compe-
tition from comparatively cheap natural gas.34 The average lifespan of a 
nuclear plant is approximately sixty years, and as of early 2014 ten plants 
(encompassing thirteen reactors) were at risk of closure.35 With each exist-
ing plant currently operating at about ninety percent capacity or more, addi-
tional production must come primarily from new reactors.36 
As of October 2015, construction of a second reactor at the Tennessee 
Valley Authority’s Watts Bar plant was nearing completion.37 That reactor is 
expected to begin commercial operation in early 2016.38 Meanwhile, four 
                                                                                                                           
 31 A Brief History of Nuclear Power in the U.S., DUKE ENERGY (July 31, 2012), 
http://nuclear.duke-energy.com/2012/07/31/a-brief-history-of-nuclear-power-in-the-u-
s/  [http://perma.cc/Q83W-QTGP]; U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., 
http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/US-Nuclear-Power-Plants 
[http://perma.cc/K6CP-9UA5]. 
 32 Nuclear Power in the USA, supra note 24. To put nuclear power’s 19% contribution in 
context, in 2013 40% of the nation’s electricity came from coal, 27% from natural gas, and the 
remainder from renewable sources like hydro, solar, wind, and geothermal. See id. In addition to 
the 100 commercial nuclear plants, there are 36 research and test reactors in the United States. 
Operating Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.NRC.gov/reactors/operating.
html [perma.cc/P4XN-S2R6] (last updated Nov. 6, 2015). 
 33 Nuclear Power in the USA, supra note 24. 
 34 Id. The accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania also had a chilling effect on enthusi-
asm for nuclear power. See Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html 
[http://perma.cc/V3NG-GNY4] (last updated Dec. 12, 2014). As a result of “a combination of 
personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures,” one reactor experienced a partial 
meltdown in 1979. Id. However, the resulting “small radioactive releases had no detectable health 
effects on plant workers or the public” according to studies conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services), the DOE, and the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania. Id. 
 35 Nuclear Power in the USA, supra note 24. 
 36 See New Nuclear Energy Facilities, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Issues-
Policy/New-Nuclear-Energy-Facilities [http://perma.cc/N5DP-YD8L]; Nuclear Power in the USA, 
supra note 24. 
 37 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUARTERLY NUCLEAR POWER DEPLOYMENT SUMMARY: OCTOBER 
2015, at 1, 3 (2015) [hereinafter OCTOBER 2015 DEPLOYMENT SUMMARY], http://www.energy.
gov/sites/prod/files/2015/10/f27/DEPLOYMENT_SCORECARD_OCTOBER_2015.pdf [http://perma.
cc/2DRU-FXVH]. 
 38 Id. 
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new nuclear reactors are under construction at two other nuclear power 
plants.39 Southern Nuclear is adding two new reactors, which will come 
online in 2019 and 2020, respectively, to the Vogtle Electric Generating 
Plant in Georgia (the “Vogtle Plant”).40 South Carolina Electric & Gas’s two 
additional reactors at its V.C. Summer facility are also scheduled to come 
online in 2019 and 2020, respectively.41 
B. Financial Barriers to Commercial Nuclear Projects 
In the United States, one of the most significant barriers to the growth 
of nuclear energy is the enormous sum of money required to construct new 
or improve existing nuclear power plants.42 A new nuclear power plant can 
cost between $6 and $8 billion to build.43 Once construction is complete, 
nuclear power plants are capable of competing with plants that rely on fossil 
fuels for electricity generation, and depending on fuel prices, can even pro-
duce electricity more cheaply.44 
The falling price of natural gas, a competing fuel, however, has 
strained nuclear power plants to the point that several have decided to cease 
operations.45 For example, the Vermont Yankee reactor located in Vernon, 
Vermont was forced to close in December 2014, after operating for forty-
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id.; Nuclear Power, SCE&G, https://www.sceg.com/about-us/power-generation/nuclear 
[http://perma.cc/EGQ2-8RQ9]. 
 42 See Fountain, supra note 7; NEI Comment Letter, supra note 7, at 2, 11–12. 
 43 FAQ About Nuclear Energy, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-
Center/FAQ-About-Nuclear-Energy [http://perma.cc/6KKS-QLZT] (expand “New Reactor Cost” 
drop-down for additional information). Post-September 11 enhanced security and post-Fukushima 
safety features account for an expanding portion of the cost. Fountain, supra note 7; Dave Gram, 
Mixed Reaction as Vermont Yankee Plant Shuts Down, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 29, 2014), http://
www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/29/mixed-reaction-vermont-yankee-plant-shuts-down/yoDZ
wQtWidGhUyOdaQpGGL/story.html [http://perma.cc/9R6Y-3XJZ]. For context, a study com-
missioned by the EIA determined that although a nuclear power plant cost about $5,500 per kilo-
watt (kW) of capacity in 2012 dollars to build, a natural-gas-fired electric plant can cost as little as 
$676/kW and a coal-fired plant as little as $2,934/kW to build. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., UP-
DATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS 6 (2013) 
[hereinafter UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES], http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/pdf/
updated_capcost.pdf [http://perma.cc/9VKB-QSPY]. 
 44 See UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES, supra note 43. A 2012 EIA study estimated that, 
in 2012 dollars, it cost $2.14 to generate a megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity using nuclear 
power, compared to $10.37/MWh and $4.47/MWh using natural gas and coal, respectively. Id. 
 45 See Jess Bidgood, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant Begins Slow Process of Closing, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/05/us/vermont-yankee-nuclear-plant-begins-
slow-process-of-closing.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/VX3U-88SD]; Fountain, supra note 7; Naureen 
S. Malik, U.S. Nuclear Plants Squeezed by Cheap Gas, Uranium Costs, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2014, 
10:33 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-02/u-s-nuclear-plants-squeezed-by-
cheap-gas-uranium-costs [http://perma.cc/Y8AZ-BVHL]. Between 2008 and December 2014 natural 
gas prices dropped by 70%. Id. 
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two years, because competition from natural-gas-fired electric plants eroded 
its profitability.46 Likewise, the operator of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 
in Plymouth, Massachusetts announced it will shutter the plant by June 
2019, citing “poor market conditions, reduced revenues and increased oper-
ational costs.”47 Since 2012, four other reactors have permanently shut 
down for financial reasons.48 
Natural gas prices will not remain at their current levels forever, but 
will inevitably rise to a point that makes nuclear power more cost-effective 
than natural gas.49 A potential problem, however, is that by the time the 
pendulum swings back toward nuclear power, the infrastructure necessary 
to support renewed demand may not exist without the addition of new nu-
clear capacity.50 The loan guarantee program laid out in Title XVII of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 is one way that the federal government can en-
courage investment in commercial nuclear power.51 Non-carbon-emitting 
nuclear power is capable of replacing harmful fossil fuels to meet our na-
tion’s future demand for electricity.52 
C. Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Authorization for  
Federal Loan Guarantees 
Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to encourage the 
growth of “secure, affordable, and reliable energy” in the future and to cre-
ate jobs in the process.53 The law encompasses support for a wide variety of 
methods of energy production in the United States.54 It addresses energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, oil, gas, coal, nuclear power, ethanol, motor 
vehicles, hydrogen, hydropower, geothermal energy, climate change tech-
nology, and tax incentives.55 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Bidgood, supra note 45; Fountain, supra note 7. 
 47 Benjamin Swasey, 43-Year-Old Pilgrim Nuclear Plant in Plymouth to Close Permanently, 
WBUR (Oct. 13, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.wbur.org/2015/10/13/pilgrim-nuclear-plant-plymouth-
close [http://perma.cc/JUZ8-X2Q3]. 
 48 Fountain, supra note 7. 
 49 See Need for New Nuclear Energy Facilities, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/
Issues-Policy/New-Nuclear-Energy-Facilities/Need-for-New-Nuclear-Facilities 
[http://perma.cc/KL4W-YY9N]. 
 50 See New Nuclear Energy Facilities, supra note 36. 
 51 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1701–1704, 119 Stat. 594, 1117–22 
(2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801–16524 (2012)); NEI Comment Letter, supra 
note 7. 
 52 See 119 Stat. at 1117–22; NEI Comment Letter, supra note 7. 
 53 See 119 Stat. at 594. 
 54 See Summary of the Energy Policy Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/
laws-regulations/summary-energy-policy-act [perma.cc/6FUJ-U5QT] (last updated Nov. 17, 2015). 
 55 Id. 
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Title XVII of the Act concerns “Incentives for Innovative Technolo-
gies” and establishes a federal loan guarantee program aimed at accom-
plishing two main goals: “to encourage commercial use in the United States 
of new or significantly improved energy-related technologies and to achieve 
substantial environmental benefits.”56 The statute authorizes the Energy 
Secretary to provide a loan guarantee for up to eighty percent of the cost of 
projects that “(1) avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases; and (2) employ new or significantly im-
proved technologies as compared to commercial technologies in service in 
the United States at the time the guarantee is issued.”57 A “loan guarantee” 
is defined as “any guarantee, insurance, or other pledge with respect to the 
payment of all or a part of the principal or interest on any debt obligation of 
a non-Federal borrower to a non-Federal lender.”58 Projects in a variety of 
industries are eligible for loan guarantees, including nuclear power.59 
In 2009, Congress appropriated $47 billion to guarantee loans made 
under Title XVII of the Act.60 Of that amount, $18.5 billion was reserved 
for nuclear power facilities.61 A year later, the DOE finalized two agree-
ments after its first round of soliciting applications for nuclear projects.62 
The first consisted of a $2 billion loan guarantee to support a uranium en-
richment facility in Idaho.63 The second was to guarantee an $8.33 billion 
loan to finance construction of the first new nuclear power plant in the 
United States in nearly thirty years.64 President Barack Obama applauded 
the loan guarantee agreement, saying: 
To meet our growing energy needs and prevent the worst conse-
quences of climate change, we need to increase our supply of nu-
clear power and today’s announcement helps to move us down 
that path. But energy leaders and experts recognize that as long as 
producing carbon pollution carries no cost, traditional plants that 
use fossil fuels will be more cost-effective than plants that use 
                                                                                                                           
 56 42 U.S.C. §§ 16511–16513; Loan Guarantees for Projects That Employ Innovative Tech-
nologies, 72 Fed. Reg. 60116, 60116 (Oct. 23, 2007) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 609 (2015)). 
 57 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801(4), 16512(c), 16513(a). 
 58 2 U.S.C. § 661a(3) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 16511(4)(A). 
 59 42 U.S.C. § 16513(b)(4). 
 60 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, 619 (2009). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See AREVA, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN GUARANTEE OFFICE, http://energy.gov/lpo/
areva [http://perma.cc/EDJ5-JSBK]; Georgia Power Company (GPC), Oglethorpe Power Corpo-
ration (OPC), Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia (MEAG), U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN 
PROGRAMS OFFICE [hereinafter Georgia Power Company], http://energy.gov/lpo/georgia-power-
company-gpc-oglethorpe-power-corporation-opc-municipal [http://perma.cc/8H5Y-8TYD]. 
 63 AREVA, supra note 62. 
 64 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 3; Georgia Power Com-
pany, supra note 62. 
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nuclear fuel. That is why we need comprehensive energy and cli-
mate legislation to create a system of incentives to make clean 
energy profitable.65 
The project, located at the Vogtle Plant, will create approximately 3500 
construction jobs and 800 permanent jobs.66 Upon their completion in 2019 
and 2020, respectively, the two new reactors will be able to generate over 
seventeen million megawatt hours of electricity per year, which is enough to 
power more than 1.5 million homes.67 The nuclear plant will avoid the re-
lease of millions of tons of carbon dioxide and thousands of tons of nitrogen 
oxides and sulfur dioxide that would otherwise be emitted by a similarly-
sized coal plant.68 
D. 2014 Department of Energy Solicitation’s Emissions and  
Technology Requirements 
On December 10, 2014, the DOE announced a second and final solici-
tation of nuclear projects seeking federal loan guarantees under Title XVII 
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.69 The release of the final solicitation 
came about two months after the DOE made a draft of the solicitation avail-
able for public comment.70 Applicants are invited to apply for a portion of 
the total $12.5 billion available for loan guarantees “to support innovative 
nuclear energy projects as a part of the Administration’s all-of-the-above 
energy strategy.”71 According to the DOE, the program’s two primary func-
tions are to encourage wider commercial use of innovative energy technol-
ogy and to provide a benefit to the environment.72 The agency believes that 
increased reliance on new or improved nuclear reactor technology will 
“help sustain and promote economic growth, produce a more stable and 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 3. 
 66 Georgia Power Company, supra note 62. 
 67 OCTOBER 2015 DEPLOYMENT SUMMARY, supra note 37; Georgia Power Company, supra 
note 62. 
 68 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 3. 
 69 See Department of Energy Issues Final $12.5 Billion Advanced Nuclear Energy Loan Guar-
antee Solicitation, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Dec. 10, 2014, 9:01 AM), http://energy.gov/articles/
department-energy-issues-final-125-billion-advanced-nuclear-energy-loan-guarantee [perma.cc/
F25G-CEEN]. 
 70 Agency Request for Comments on Draft Solicitation for Advanced Nuclear Energy Pro-
jects, 79 Fed. Reg. 59763, 59763 (Oct. 3, 2014); Department of Energy Issues Final $12.5 Billion 
Advanced Nuclear Energy Loan Guarantee Solicitation, supra note 69. 
 71 Department of Energy Issues Final $12.5 Billion Advanced Nuclear Energy Loan Guaran-
tee Solicitation, supra note 69. 
 72 See id. 
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secure energy supply and economy for the United States, and improve the 
environment.”73 
Of the $12.5 billion, $2 billion is reserved for “front-end” activities 
such as uranium conversion and enrichment.74 The remaining $10.5 billion 
is available for nuclear power facilities, including the construction of stand-
ard and small modular reactors as well as certain modifications to existing 
reactors.75 To be eligible for a loan guarantee, a nuclear project must meet 
the following two threshold requirements: 
(a) Avoid[], reduce[], or sequester[] anthropogenic emission of 
greenhouse gases; and 
(b) Employ[] New or Significantly Improved Technology as 
compared to Commercial Technology in service in the United 
State [sic] at the time the Term Sheet is issued.76 
In its final solicitation, the DOE indicated several particular types of pro-
jects—uranium conversion and enrichment, fabrication of nuclear reactor 
components, or construction of brand new reactors, for example—that 
would be eligible to apply for loan guarantees as long as they met these two 
threshold requirements.77 Included in the DOE’s list were projects to uprate 
existing nuclear reactors.78 
According to the final solicitation, an uprate refers to a project “con-
sisting of improvements and/or modifications to an existing reactor that is 
operating but that due to such improvements and/or modifications will op-
erate more efficiently.”79 In other words, an uprate functions to increase the 
plant’s output of electric power.80 To increase its output, a reactor will typi-
cally need to use more highly enriched uranium or a fresh batch of fuel 
rods.81 Because the reactor is now producing more energy, the rest of the 
plant’s components sometimes have to be modified to ensure that they can 
withstand the increased operating temperature and additional steam produc-
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Loan Guarantees for Projects That Employ Innovative Technologies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
63544, 63544 (Dec. 4, 2009) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 609 (2015)). 
 74 FINAL SOLICITATION, supra note 15, at 2. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. For purposes of the solicitation, the term “greenhouse gases” includes carbon monoxide 
(CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O). See Attachment C Summary 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data Final, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, http://
energy.gov/lpo/downloads/attachment-c-summary-ghg-emissions-data-final-0 [http://perma.cc/F4KB-
B4BP] (follow “Attachment-C-Summary-GHG-Emissions-Data-FINAL.xlsx” hyperlink). 
 77 FINAL SOLICITATION, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
 78 Id. at 2. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Background on Power Uprates, supra note 11. 
 81 Id. 
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tion.82 This could mean modifying or replacing components such as pipes, 
valves, pumps, heat exchangers, or electrical transformers and generators.83 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) recognizes three different 
types of uprates: measurement uncertainty recapture (used to achieve a reactor 
power increase of two percent or less), stretch power (a maximum increase of 
seven percent), and extended power (as much as a twenty percent increase in 
reactor power).84 
1. Solicitation Terminology 
Neither the Act nor its companion regulations define “avoid,” “re-
duce,” or “sequester.”85 The available guidance consists of projects that 
have already received loan guarantees under the Title XVII program.86 Be-
cause no applicant has yet received loan guarantees for uprates, the Vogtle 
Plant’s successful loan guarantee application for construction of new nucle-
ar reactors effectively illustrates the agency’s interpretation of “avoid, re-
duce, or sequester.”87 The Vogtle Plant received the loan guarantee to add 
two new reactors to the existing two reactors it already operates at the site.88 
The DOE’s February 2014 response to a comment from the Blue Ridge 
Environmental Defense League (“BREDL”) indicates that the agency be-
lieves that the new reactors at the Vogtle Plant would meet the first thresh-
old requirement.89 In response to the DOE’s announcement regarding the 
Vogtle Plant loan guarantee, BREDL argued that the design of the two new 
reactors would fail to avoid, reduce, or sequester greenhouse gas emis-
sions.90 The DOE responded that its review of the Vogtle Plant’s application 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Types of Power Uprates, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.NRC.gov/
reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates/type-power.html [http://perma.cc/88MW-8AV9] (last 
updated Oct. 23, 2014). 
 85 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16511–16516 (2012); 10 C.F.R. §§ 609.1–609.18 (2015). 
 86 See Section 1703 Loan Program, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, http://
energy.gov/lpo/services/section-1703-loan-program [http://perma.cc/8KXG-W96K]; infra notes 
87–101 and accompanying text. The DOE’s Loan Programs Office lists two entries under the 
heading “Sample 1703 Projects” on its website: Georgia Power Company (GPC), Oglethorpe 
Power Corporation (OPC), and the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia (MEAG)’s project to 
build two new reactors; and AREVA Enrichment Services, LLC’s project to provide uranium 
enrichment services. Section 1703 Loan Program, supra. 
 87 See Georgia Power Company, supra note 62; Portfolio Projects, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 
LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, http://energy.gov/lpo/portfolio-projects [perma.cc/8NDE-KAB6]. The 
uranium enrichment facility that received a $2 billion loan guarantee in 2010 is not categorized as 
an uprate. See FINAL SOLICITATION, supra note 15, at 2; AREVA, supra note 62. 
 88 Georgia Power Company, supra note 62. 
 89 See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 90 Issuance of Loan Guarantees to Various Applicants for the Vogtle Electric Generating 
Plant—Units 3 and 4 in Burke County, GA, 79 Fed. Reg. 10510, 10512–13 (Feb. 25, 2014). 
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included an NRC comparison of emissions from a nuclear power plant to 
those from a similarly-sized fossil fuel plant.91 The NRC concluded “that 
the nuclear plant has approximately 1/10th the annual CO2 emission rate of 
a natural-gas-fired power plant and 1/20th the emissions of a coal-fired 
power plant.”92 It is clear from its response that the DOE accepted that the 
new nuclear reactors would avoid, reduce, or sequester greenhouse gas 
emissions.93 
Likewise, by approving the Vogtle Plant’s application, the DOE recog-
nized that the reactor design that both new reactors will use (Westinghouse 
AP1000 Generation III+) constitutes a “New or Significantly Improved 
Technology,” pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 609.2.94 That plant will be the first in 
the United States to use this reactor design, which boasts a more efficient 
operation due to redesigned components and safety improvements.95 Alt-
hough the Act does not define New or Significantly Improved Technology, 
the regulations make it clear that “Commercial Technology” and New or 
Significantly Improved Technology are mutually exclusive.96 The latter en-
compasses technology related to the production, consumption, or transpor-
tation of energy that has either: “(1) Only recently been developed, discov-
ered or learned; or (2) Involves or constitutes one or more meaningful and 
important improvements in productivity or value, in comparison to Com-
mercial Technologies in use in the United States at the time the Term Sheet 
is issued.”97 
According to the statute, “‘[C]ommercial technology’ means a tech-
nology in general use in the commercial marketplace” and does not include 
technology in use solely in a demonstration project funded by the DOE.98 
The regulations promulgated by the DOE indicate that a given technology is 
in “general use” if it is: (1) being used in at least three domestic commercial 
projects “in the same general application as in the proposed project”; and 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See id. at 10510, 10513. 
 94 See 10 C.F.R. § 609.2 (2015); Issuance of Loan Guarantees to Various Applicants for the 
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant—Units 3 and 4 in Burke County, GA, 79 Fed. Reg. at 10510, 
10512; Georgia Power Company, supra note 62. 
 95 See AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant, WESTINGHOUSE, http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/
New-Plants/AP1000-PWR [http://perma.cc/QCD9-R3CA]; Georgia Power Company, supra note 62; 
Overview, WESTINGHOUSE, http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/New-Plants/AP1000-PWR/
Overview [http://perma.cc/4N9D-P5BL]. 
 96 10 C.F.R. § 609.2; Loan Guarantees for Projects That Employ Innovative Technologies, 72 
Fed. Reg. 60116, 60117 (Oct. 23, 2007) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 609). “New or Significantly 
Improved Technology means a technology concerned with the production, consumption or trans-
portation of energy and that is not a Commercial Technology.” § 609.2. 
 97 § 609.2. 
 98 42 U.S.C. § 16511(1)(A) (2012). 
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(2) has been operating in each project for at least five years.99 All projects 
that have already received Title XVII loan guarantees are automatically 
counted toward this three commercial project minimum threshold.100 If a 
proposed project involves technology that is deemed to be Commercial 
Technology at the time the DOE issues the term sheet for a loan guarantee, 
then the project is not eligible under Title XVII.101 
2. Application Process 
When the DOE reviews applications, it applies “the criteria set forth in 
Title XVII of [the Act], the implementing regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 609, 
and the applicable solicitation issued by DOE.”102 Applications are submit-
ted in two parts, with the first (“Part I”) functioning primarily to establish 
that the project meets the two eligibility requirements under Title XVII, in 
addition to conditions such as being located in the United States and not 
benefitting from certain other federal assistance.103 The DOE will invite 
eligible projects, as determined from Part I, to proceed with a second part 
(“Part II”) submission, which involves a more detailed review of various 
programmatic, technical, and financial factors.104 For example, the DOE 
will assess the likelihood that a project will actually repay all debt, whether 
or not guaranteed by the DOE during the Part II phase.105 
E. The Chevron Doctrine and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation 
The DOE’s Loan Guarantee Solicitation Announcement reflects the 
agency’s interpretation of Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.106 
The United States Supreme Court affords a significant amount of deference 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See 10 C.F.R. § 609.2. The regulation states: “The five-year period shall be measured, for 
each project, starting on the in service date of the project or facility employing that particular 
technology. For purposes of this section, commercial projects include projects that have been the 
recipients of a loan guarantee from DOE under this part.” Id. 
 100 10 C.F.R. § 609.2. 
 101 Id. A “term sheet” is “an offering document issued by DOE that specifies the detailed 
terms and conditions under which DOE may enter into a Conditional Commitment with the Appli-
cant.” Id. 
 102 Issuance of Loan Guarantees to Various Applicants for the Vogtle Electric Generating 
Plant—Units 3 and 4 in Burke County, GA, 79 Fed. Reg. 10510, 10512 (Feb. 25, 2014). 
 103 FINAL SOLICITATION, supra note 15, at 7. The DOE plans to evaluate three separate 
rounds of applications, with the option to add additional rounds. Id. at 13. The first, second, and 
third round deadlines for Part I are March 18, 2015, September 16, 2015, and March 16, 2016, 
respectively. Id. The corresponding Part II due dates are October 14, 2015, April 13, 2016, and 
October 19, 2016. Id. 
 104 Id. at 8. 
 105 Id. at 9. 
 106 See infra notes 187–267 and accompanying text. 
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to agency interpretation of statutory language, often referred to as “Chevron 
deference.”107 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is the 
seminal case regarding a federal agency’s discretion to interpret the statute 
it is administering.108 Justice Stevens articulated a two-step process by 
which a court should review an agency’s interpretation of a statute.109 First, 
a court must determine whether Congress has already “directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”110 If congressional intent is clear, both the 
agency and the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed in-
tent of Congress”; the issue is settled, and the court need not continue its 
inquiry.111 Only when Congress has not spoken on the issue at hand should 
a court proceed to step two: assessing whether the agency’s answer to the 
question “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”112 
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court held that because Con-
gress did not specifically address the question at issue in the statute or its 
legislative history, the legislature implicitly delegated the power to interpret 
the statutory language to the agency.113 Because of the agency’s unique ex-
pertise and sound reasoning, the Court upheld the agency’s interpretation.114 
The Court stated that unless regulations are arbitrary, capricious, or in con-
flict with the statute, they will remain in force.115 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982, 1003 
(2005); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214–15, 222 (2002); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 
LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647–48, 651–52, 656 (1990). 
 108 See 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984); supra note 107 and accompanying text. The case centered 
on a dispute over the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations implementing the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1977. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
 109 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. Justice Stevens wrote: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it 
is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that 
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the ab-
sence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
Id. 
 110 Id. at 842. 
 111 Id. at 842–43. 
 112 Id. at 843. 
 113 Id. at 842–44, 851. 
 114 Id. at 865–66. 
 115 Id. at 844. 
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In the decades following Chevron, the Court has further clarified its 
analysis with respect to whether a statutory provision is ambiguous.116 Sub-
sequent cases indicate that a court should not consider a statutory provision 
in isolation when applying the first step of its Chevron analysis.117 This is 
because “the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may 
only become evident when placed in context.”118 Reading a provision in the 
proper context requires the court to consider how it fits within “the overall 
statutory scheme,” reading the statute (including the provision in question) 
as a “harmonious whole.”119 The proper context also includes taking ac-
count of other statutes that may affect the meaning of the provision in ques-
tion, especially when another statute is more specific.120 A court should be 
guided by common sense regarding how likely Congress was to delegate a 
particular policy decision to an agency in light of its economic and political 
importance.121 
Also, whether the statutory language is such that an agency is left to 
determine how to implement legislative policy is of help to a court in de-
termining whether ambiguity exists.122 Ambiguity exists because the statute 
either does not provide specific terms, or terms are provided but do not ex-
haust the possible scenarios that may arise.123 Congress leaves a gap in a 
statute knowing that it will be implemented by an agency precisely because 
it wants and expects that agency to fill it.124 This is particularly common 
when the legislation involves complicated regulatory schemes or requires 
specialized knowledge to implement.125 The fact that an agency, rather than 
a court, possesses the relevant know-how “is one of the principal justifica-
                                                                                                                           
 116 See infra notes 117–127 and accompanying text. 
 117 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); see Brown v. 
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of 
statutory context.”), superseded by statute, 21 U.S.C. § 387 (2012), as recognized in Bullitt Fiscal 
Ct. v. Bullitt Cty. Bd. of Health, 434 S.W.3d 29 (Ky. 2013). 
 118 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132. 
 119 Id. at 133 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); FCC v. 
Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392–93 (1999). 
 123 See id. 
 124 See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (stating that there is a 
“presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an 
agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and 
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity 
allows.”). 
 125 See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704, 712 
(1994) (deferring to the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) knowledge of “the complex 
statutory and regulatory scheme that governs our Nation’s waters”); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125, 134 (1985) (deferring to the EPA’s “understanding of 
this very ‘complex statute’”). 
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tions behind Chevron deference.”126 Legislation that “has produced a com-
plex and highly technical regulatory program requiring significant exper-
tise” may be taken as evidence of Congressional intent to delegate broad 
policymaking discretion to the agency.127 
Once a court determines that Congress has not spoken directly on the 
question at issue, it must next assess whether the guidance provided by the 
agency is based on a permissible construction of the statute.128 Generally, a 
“rational” or “reasonable” interpretation of a statute will be entitled to 
Chevron deference.129 A rational or reasonable agency interpretation does 
not contradict the language of the statute itself, but instead is consistent 
with the intent of Congress and the underlying purpose of the statute.130 
Compared to Congress, an agency’s higher level of expertise in the subject 
matter of the legislation means that it is uniquely equipped to administer it, 
and the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that agency judgments that 
further the policy goals of the statute deserve deference.131 
An agency’s interpretation is valid when it is based on “a” permissible 
construction, rather than “the” permissible construction.132 Subsequent cas-
es confirm that a particular interpretation adopted by the implementing 
agency will not be struck down, as long as it is rational, just because there 
are competing permissible interpretations.133 Moreover, the agency’s inter-
pretation need not even be the “best” interpretation to be upheld, so long as 
it is reasonable.134 It is not enough for an opponent to simply argue that its 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990). 
 127 Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991); see United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (“Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of 
ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or 
by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”). 
 128 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 129 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002); Chem. 
Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125. 
 130 See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999).; Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1992) (“If the agency interpretation is not in 
conflict with the plain language of the statute, deference is due.”). 
 131 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 
(2005); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 651–52, 656; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
 132 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 133 See Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398–99 (1996) (“When the legislative 
prescription is not free from ambiguity, the administrator must choose between conflicting reason-
able interpretations.”); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125 (“This view of the agency charged with 
administering the statute is entitled to considerable deference; and to sustain it, we need not find 
that it is the only permissible construction that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA’s un-
derstanding of this very ‘complex statute’ is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from 
substituting its judgment for that of EPA.”). 
 134 Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 980 (“If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implement-
ing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s 
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interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision is different than, or even 
superior to, the implementing agency’s interpretation.135 The challenger’s 
burden is to prove that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is unreason-
able based on the statute’s underlying policy.136 
It is especially difficult to convince a court that an agency’s interpreta-
tion is invalid when the agency has arrived at its interpretation through for-
mal administrative proceedings, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.137 
Rulemaking is not limited to the process of promulgating regulations; ra-
ther, the term “rule” has a broader meaning that “means the whole or a part 
of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future ef-
fect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describ-
ing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.”138 
Notice of a rulemaking is published in the Federal Register so that interest-
ed parties may be informed of the time, place, and nature of the proceed-
ings, the legal authority for the proposed rule, and a description of the pro-
posed rule or the relevant subjects and issues involved.139 Interested parties 
can then participate in the rulemaking process by submitting written com-
ments to the agency, sometimes with the opportunity for oral presenta-
tion.140 
When Congress delegates to an agency the authority to make rules car-
rying the force of law, the agency’s interpretation of a particular statutory 
provision is entitled to Chevron deference, as long as it is promulgated in 
the exercise of that rulemaking authority.141 Congress may choose to dele-
gate this rulemaking power to an agency charged with administering a stat-
ute that is particularly technical, complex, or dynamic precisely because it 
wants the agency to apply its expertise through a formal procedure.142 In 
                                                                                                                           
construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the 
best statutory interpretation.”). 
 135 See id.; Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002); 
Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125. 
 136 See Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. at 333; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863. 
 137 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); United States v. Haggar 
Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 390 (1999) (“Particularly in light of the fact that the agency utilized 
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process before issuing the regulations, the argument that they 
were not intended to be entitled to judicial deference implies a sufficient departure from conven-
tional contemporary administrative practice that we ought not to adopt it absent a different statuto-
ry structure and more express language to this effect in the regulations themselves.”). 
 138 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). 
 139 Id. § 553(b). 
 140 Id. § 553(c). 
 141 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27 (“We hold that administrative implementation of a par-
ticular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegat-
ed authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”). 
 142 See supra notes 122–127 and accompanying text. 
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such a case, a court is justified in deferring to an agency interpretation.143 
The notice-and-comment procedure helps to ensure that the rulemaking 
process is fair and legitimate.144 It provides notice of the agency’s intent to 
interested parties who can then confront and help resolve potential issues.145 
The comment process creates a public record in support of the agency’s rea-
soning and demonstrates how it arrived at its conclusions.146 To defeat a 
regulation promulgated by an agency through its rulemaking power, an op-
ponent must convince a court that the regulation is “procedurally defective, 
arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”147 
II. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S 
NUCLEAR LOAN GUARANTEE SOLICITATION ANNOUNCEMENT 
In response to its October 3, 2014 notice announcing a “potential fu-
ture solicitation for Federal Loan Guarantees for Advanced Nuclear Energy 
Projects,” the Department of Energy’s (“DOE”) Loan Programs Office 
(“LPO”) received comments from thirty-seven interested organizations.148 
The comments urged the DOE to either abandon the nuclear loan guarantee 
program altogether, or at a minimum, make substantial changes to the draft 
solicitation before distributing a second round of loan guarantees.149 Re-
gardless of its position on nuclear power from a safety or environmental 
perspective, each group focused on the potential illegality of the program 
and emphasized the financial perils associated with the LPO’s draft solicita-
tion.150 In particular, the confusion surrounding the meaning of certain re-
quirements included in the authorizing statute and solicitation prompted 
commentators to question how uprates—a project category identified by the 
DOE as a potential applicant—could receive loan guarantees without violat-
ing the terms of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the “Act”).151 
A. Joint Comments from Thirty-Five Groups in Opposition to the 
Department of Energy’s Loan Guarantee Solicitation 
Thirty-five environmental, public health, and anti-nuclear groups 
(“Joint Commentators”) submitted joint comments to the LPO in which 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S at 226–27. 
 144 See Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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 146 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984). 
 147 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227. 
 148 Agency Request for Comments on Draft Solicitation for Advanced Nuclear Energy Pro-
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 149 See infra notes 152–181 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 152–181 and accompanying text. 
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they threatened to litigate a final solicitation that preserved the language of 
the draft solicitation related to uprates that they believe violates the Act.152 
They asserted that the DOE’s draft solicitation constitutes an impermissible 
interpretation of the Act.153 The Joint Commentators stated that the loan 
guarantee program “could be used to fund projects in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
16513,” a section of the Act that describes which projects are eligible for 
government “Incentives for Innovative Technologies,” or loan guarantees.154 
The Joint Commentators are opposed to the inclusion of uprates among the 
project categories the DOE indicated might be eligible to apply.155 They 
argued that the category “must be dropped from this and any future solicita-
tion,” because it encompasses projects related to nuclear reactors that al-
ready exist, as opposed to brand new reactors to be constructed in the fu-
ture.156 
Simply put, the Joint Commentators argued that it would be impossible 
to further reduce the level of greenhouse gases emitted by an existing nu-
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Other groups, such as Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Institute of Neurotoxi-
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focused on issues related to public health, including nuclear power. Steven Gilbert, The Institute of 
Neurotoxicology and Neurological Disorders, INST. OF NEUROTOXICOLOGY & NEUROLOGICAL 
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3NFZ-LZ87] (last updated Mar. 3, 2015); Oregon About, PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, http://www.psr.org/chapters/oregon/about.html; Washington About Us, PHYSICIANS FOR 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.psr.org/chapters/washington/about/. 
 153 See NIRS Comment Letter, supra note 152. 
 154 See 42 U.S.C. § 16513 (2012); NIRS Comment Letter, supra note 152. 
 155 NIRS Comment Letter, supra note 152. 
 156 Id. The Joint Commentators did not dispute the legality of awarding DOE loan guarantees 
to projects to build new nuclear reactors, and in fact they stated that projects in that category are 
“both legal and theoretically, at least, viable.” See id. 
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clear reactor by making the sort of improvement or modification that would 
constitute an uprate.157 Based on that fact, no uprates would be able to satis-
fy the first loan guarantee eligibility requirement, which permits the Secre-
tary of the Department of Energy to make guarantees “only for projects that 
avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases.”158 Because the two requirements expressed in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16513 are conjunctive, if uprates cannot satisfy the first requirement, then 
they will never meet the Act’s eligibility threshold and therefore cannot le-
gally receive loan guarantees under the DOE’s program.159 
The Joint Commentators argued that any existing nuclear reactor has 
already realized its full potential for avoiding, reducing, or sequestering its 
greenhouse gas emissions.160 Although they did not elaborate much on this 
point, their argument was supported by the fact that nuclear power plants do 
not emit any greenhouse gases as a by-product of the electricity they gener-
ate.161 In contrast to a power plant that generates electricity using coal, oil, 
or natural gas—which can incrementally reduce the total amount of green-
house gases it releases because such plants do not start at zero emissions—a 
nuclear power plant begins with a baseline emission level of zero.162 There-
fore, they allege that it is impossible for existing nuclear reactors to further 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions through uprates.163 
The thirty-five groups also asserted that uprates would be unable to 
meet the second requirement for loan guarantee eligibility indicated by the 
Act.164 The second prong of 42 U.S.C. § 16513(a) states that eligible pro-
jects must “employ new or significantly improved technologies as com-
pared to commercial technologies in service in the United States at the time 
the guarantee is issued.”165 Their criticism was focused on the impossibility 
of uprates utilizing such technology.166 The Joint Commentators identified 
the four nuclear reactors currently under construction as the standard by 
which “new or significantly improved” should be measured, and concluded 
that “no uprates . . . to existing reactors can be defined as either newer or 
significantly improved from those.”167 
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 158 See § 16513(a); NIRS Comment Letter, supra note 152. 
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The Joint Commentators argued that the DOE’s inclusion of uprates as 
a category of projects eligible for loan guarantees was “nothing more than 
an attempt to prop up—at taxpayer risk—current reactors that have become 
uneconomical due to age-related deterioration, poor reactor design, or simp-
ly lower-cost competition from electricity generation sources like solar and 
wind power.”168 They accused the DOE of issuing the draft solicitation “in 
an obvious effort to use up” the $10.6 billion Congress authorized to fi-
nance investment in nuclear reactors “whether or not it serves the original 
purpose of the creating legislation.”169 The groups demanded that the DOE 
therefore abandon its nuclear loan guarantee program altogether and either 
channel the remaining billions into loan guarantees for renewable energy 
projects, or return the funds to the Treasury.170 
B. Comments from the Nuclear Energy Institute 
The Nuclear Energy Institute (“NEI”) represents the interests of the 
American nuclear industry.171 The organization, which describes itself as 
“responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters af-
fecting the nuclear energy industry, including regulatory, financial, technical 
and legislative issues,” responded to the DOE’s request for feedback on the 
draft solicitation.172 The NEI counts among its members “all companies li-
censed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, 
nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel cycle facili-
ties, [and] materials licensees” (for example, hospitals that use radioactive 
drugs or imaging devices).173 
The NEI met the DOE’s second solicitation for nuclear loan guarantees 
with measured praise.174 Although the NEI commended the DOE “for seek-
ing to expand the universe of projects that might avail themselves of the 
loan guarantee program,” it was highly skeptical as to how likely the draft 
solicitation would be to meet this goal, in part because of uprates’ question-
able ability to satisfy the statutory requirements.175 
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 169 See id. The Joint Commentators cited Congress’s vision of a nuclear renaissance as the 
purpose of the legislation creating the DOE loan guarantee program. Id. 
 170 See id. 
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Like the Joint Commentators, the NEI was dissatisfied with the DOE’s 
treatment of uprates.176 It noted that uprates can range in cost from “less 
than $500 million to over $1 billion,” depending on the size of the reac-
tor.177 Even though some companies finance less expensive uprates out of 
pocket, they might want to take advantage of the loan guarantee program 
when undertaking a sufficiently expensive uprate, such as the one complet-
ed by a Florida nuclear plant in 2013 at a cost of $3.4 billion.178 The NEI 
questioned how power uprates could qualify for the program, given that 
they “typically do not employ ‘new or significantly improved technology’ 
defined narrowly,” even though they result in potentially significant im-
provements to the nuclear power plant.179 The organization asked the DOE 
to clarify exactly how it would apply the “new or significantly improved 
technology” standard to power uprates.180 
Despite the opposition discussed above, the DOE proceeded with its 
solicitation for nuclear loan guarantees and released the final solicitation on 
December 10, 2014, without making any changes to the language regarding 
uprates.181 
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S DECISION TO ALLOW UPRATES  
TO APPLY FOR NUCLEAR LOAN GUARANTEES IS WORTHY  
OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
According to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the “Act”), regardless of 
whether the energy source is solar, wind, fossil fuels, or nuclear, any appli-
cation for a Title XVII loan guarantee from the Department of Energy 
(“DOE”) must meet two threshold conditions.182 First, an eligible project 
must “avoid[], reduce[], or sequester[] . . . anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases.”183 Second, it must “employ[] new or significantly im-
proved” technology.184 As the DOE prepares to consider applications for the 
over $12 billion set aside for loan guarantees for nuclear energy projects, 
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supporters and opponents of the program alike have questioned how certain 
project categories identified by the DOE, including uprates, will fit into the 
statutory scheme.185 In fact, the confusion surrounding project eligibility is 
so great that some groups have threatened to sue the DOE for illegally fund-
ing certain nuclear projects, should it proceed.186 
Such litigation, however, should prove fruitless for opponents because 
the DOE’s decision to include uprates among the projects eligible for nucle-
ar loan guarantees should survive a Chevron challenge.187 In failing to nar-
rowly define “eligible project,” Congress implicitly delegated to the DOE 
the authority to implement the Title XVII loan guarantee program across a 
range of industries.188 A court should defer to the agency’s interpretation of 
the Act—which allows uprates to apply for loan guarantees—because it is 
reasonable and consistent with both the language of the statute and its un-
derlying policy.189 
A. The Ambiguity Concerning Nuclear Projects in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 Indicates a Congressional Delegation of  
Authority to the Department of Energy 
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
the United States Supreme Court explored when a court should defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute.190 The first consideration is whether 
Congress has already “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” for 
if it has then both the agency and the court are bound to act in accordance 
with the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”191 
It is clear from the text of the Act that Congress did not express its un-
ambiguous intent with respect to the eligibility of any specific type of pro-
ject in any industry, including nuclear uprates.192 Although it limited the 
Secretary of the Department of Energy’s (“Energy Secretary”) ability to 
make loan guarantees to projects that “avoid, reduce, or sequester” emis-
sions of greenhouse gases and “employ new or significantly improved tech-
nologies,” the Act did not explain the meaning of any of these terms.193 
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Nowhere in the approximately 550-page Act did Congress directly address 
how it intended these terms to apply to potential projects across a diverse 
range of industries, let alone specific projects within the nuclear sector.194 
The omission renders Congress’s intent with respect to uprates ambigu-
ous.195 Congress did not indicate which types of nuclear projects it envi-
sioned would be eligible for DOE loan guarantees, instead leaving that de-
cision to the agency.196 
The Act presents the two requirements in an incredibly broad outline 
of the program, which makes no reference to the eligibility of specific pro-
jects like uprates to nuclear facilities.197 The same section of the statute that 
lays out the two eligibility requirements also contains a list of ten categories 
from which projects shall be eligible.198 This means that there are potential-
ly ten different contexts through which to interpret the two requirements 
given the DOE’s practice of issuing solicitations by industry based on Con-
gressional appropriations.199 The statute does not distinguish what, for ex-
ample, is necessary in order for an oil refinery, renewable energy system, or 
advanced nuclear energy facility to achieve avoidance, reduction, or seques-
tration of emissions despite the fact that they utilize different raw materials, 
equipment, and processes.200 Congress did not provide any guidance at all 
related to which kinds of projects within each industry or method of power 
generation would satisfy the first requirement of Title XVII.201 Nor did 
Congress elaborate on what constitutes “new or significantly improved 
technology” or identify which types of projects would satisfy this second 
requirement.202 The fact that Congress took the opportunity to define 
“commercial technology” while omitting any definition of “new or signifi-
cantly improved technology” implies that it deliberately left this gap.203 
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Implicit in these omissions is Congress’s desire to let the agency re-
sponsible for implementing the Title XVII loan guarantee program deter-
mine how these standards will be applied across a range of different modes 
of power generation and which types of projects will be eligible.204 The text 
of the Act provides only very general guidance with respect to project eligi-
bility, without any instructions to the agency that are more specific than the 
two threshold requirements.205 Given the complexity of the loan guarantee 
program, this is evidence that Congress wanted and expected the DOE to 
supply these missing details.206 As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in Smiley v. 
Citibank (South Dakota): 
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not because of a 
presumption that they drafted the provisions in question, or were 
present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but ra-
ther because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambigu-
ity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, under-
stood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by 
the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to pos-
sess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.207 
A system for distributing billions of dollars in federal loan guarantees 
is necessarily a highly complicated one.208 Indeed, administering the Title 
XVII loan guarantee program requires extensive financial expertise and 
specialized technical knowledge of each sector in which a loan guarantee 
may be made, including the nuclear energy industry.209 Congress delegated 
that power to the DOE because the agency has the expertise required to 
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competently assess financial and operational risks associated with potential 
applicants across a range of industries, and thus has the ability to compe-
tently identify appropriate candidates for loan guarantees.210 
B. A Court Should Defer to the Department of Energy’s Interpretation of 
the Eligibility Requirements That Includes Uprates Because It Is Based  
on a Permissible Construction of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
Having determined that Congress did not express an unambiguous in-
tent regarding which types of projects will be eligible for Title XVII loan 
guarantees, and likewise did not address whether uprates to nuclear facili-
ties are among them, a court should conclude that Congress implicitly dele-
gated the power to interpret the language of Title XVII to the DOE as the 
implementing agency.211 A court would thus proceed to the second prong of 
its Chevron analysis and assess whether inclusion of uprates in the category 
of eligible projects “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”212 
In this case, a court would likely find that the agency’s inclusion of uprates 
reflects a permissible interpretation of the statute because it is consistent 
with both the language of Title XVII and its underlying policy.213 Therefore, 
in line with previous applications of Chevron to agency interpretations of 
statutes involving complex technology and complicated implementation 
schemes, a court should defer to the DOE’s interpretation of the Title XVII 
eligibility requirements that permits applications seeking loan guarantees 
for uprates to existing nuclear facilities.214 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an agency’s 
interpretation is a permissible construction of a statute if it is reasonable or 
rational, meaning that it does not contradict the statutory language and is 
consistent with the policies Congress sought to further.215 As discussed be-
low, the DOE’s interpretation of Title XVII satisfies this test.216 
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1. Uprate Eligibility Does Not Contradict the Plain Language of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 
Despite contrary assertions by the signatories of the Comments on De-
partment of Energy Loan Guarantee Solicitation Announcement (the “Joint 
Commentators”) and the Nuclear Energy Institute (“NEI”), distributing Title 
XVII loan guarantees to uprate projects does not contradict the language of 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 because uprates can satisfy the two threshold 
eligibility requirements laid out in 42 U.S.C. § 16513.217 The statute re-
quires that all eligible projects satisfy two threshold conditions: (1) avoid, 
reduce, or sequester emissions of greenhouse gases, and (2) employ new or 
significantly improved technologies as compared to commercial technolo-
gies in service in the United States at the time the guarantee is issued.218 The 
Joint Commentators asserted that it is impossible for any pre-existing nu-
clear reactor to further avoid or reduce greenhouse gas emissions.219 They 
argued that once a reactor begins operating, for the remainder of its life it 
does not have the ability to ever increase the amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions it is avoiding or reducing beyond the amount it avoided or re-
duced when it first came online.220 This assertion is incorrect.221 
Just as a newly constructed nuclear reactor can satisfy the first thresh-
old requirement, so too can an uprate to an existing nuclear reactor.222 In 
their comments, the Joint Commentators did not dispute that a brand new 
nuclear reactor coming online is able to avoid, reduce, or sequester green-
house gas emissions, and accordingly they did not accuse the DOE of ille-
gally funding the two new reactors at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant in 
Georgia (the “Vogtle Plant”).223 The approved project at the Vogtle Plant 
indicates that efforts to produce additional electricity using nuclear genera-
tion—whether from brand new reactors or increased generation capacity 
achieved through uprates of existing reactors—satisfy the first requirement 
of Title XVII.224 When it announced its approval of the Vogtle Plant project, 
the DOE explained how it satisfied the requirement that eligible projects 
must avoid, reduce, or sequester greenhouse gas emissions: 
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This alternative offers environmental benefits consistent with the 
statutory objectives of Title XVII of [the Act], which include re-
ductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Compared to coal-fired 
and natural-gas-fired sources producing the same amount of base-
load power, annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emission rates from nu-
clear power plants (including the fuel cycle processes) are con-
siderably less.225 
The DOE and Joint Commentators appear to agree that building a new reac-
tor, like those at the Vogtle Plant, is an acceptable way to avoid, reduce, or 
sequester greenhouse gas emissions.226 The DOE noted that this is because 
the new reactors are producing additional power without emitting anywhere 
near the level of greenhouse gases that alternative fuel sources like natural 
gas or coal do.227 Because an uprate is a project to expand a reactor’s output 
of electric power, potentially by as much as twenty percent, the same logic 
can apply.228 
An uprated reactor will generate more electricity than the same reactor 
prior to the uprate.229 Both a brand new reactor and an existing reactor that 
has been uprated will produce more electricity compared to an un-built or 
un-uprated reactor, respectively.230 The more electricity that is produced 
using nuclear power, the less necessary it is to rely on coal-fired and natu-
ral-gas-fired plants to produce electricity, resulting in a greater avoidance, 
reduction, or sequestration of greenhouse gas emissions.231 Therefore, the 
Joint Commentators’ argument that only newly-constructed nuclear reac-
tors, and not uprates, are able to avoid, reduce, or sequester greenhouse gas-
es is illogical.232 The DOE’s conclusion that uprates may satisfy the first 
eligibility requirement of Title XVII is consistent with the language of 42 
U.S.C. § 16513(a)(1), and therefore is a rational interpretation of the statute 
deserving of deference.233 
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Likewise, the DOE’s interpretation that uprates can employ new or 
significantly improved technology in satisfaction of the second threshold 
requirement of Title XVII does not contradict the language of the statute 
and is therefore deserving of judicial deference.234 The Joint Commentators 
argued that just as uprates cannot satisfy the first threshold requirement of 
Title XVII, they also cannot satisfy the second requirement of employing 
new or significantly improved technology.235 They stated, “The ‘new or sig-
nificantly improved technologies’ are represented by the four reactors now 
under construction. No uprates or upgrades to existing reactors can be de-
fined as either newer or significantly improved from those.”236 
The DOE must disagree with the assertion that uprates will never uti-
lize a technology that is “new or significantly improved,” otherwise it 
would not have included them in its solicitation.237 The Joint Commentators 
did not provide any support for the idea that innovation in the nuclear pow-
er industry has been exhausted.238 The very fact that the DOE has already 
issued a loan guarantee to a nuclear power facility (the project at the Vogtle 
Plant) is evidence that technological advancements have been made in the 
thirty years since the last nuclear reactor was built in the United States.239 
Moreover, as of October 2015 three reactor designs certified by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) are under consideration for future use in 
the United States, and an additional design is undergoing NRC review.240 
The Supreme Court has indicated that an agency’s expertise is worthy 
of Chevron deference when it is interpreting statutes that deal with complex 
or technical subject matter that is beyond Congress’s practical capability.241 
The DOE’s decision to include uprates in its solicitation reflects the conclu-
sion of an agency with tremendous expertise in nuclear technology.242 
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Therefore the agency, rather than the courts, is in the best position to define 
technology standards as they apply to a range of sectors, including the nu-
clear power industry.243 The Court has adopted the position that when an 
agency is charged with “fashioning appropriate standards,” and that process 
“requires an expertise and attention to detail that exceeds the normal prov-
ince of Congress,” it is reluctant to substitute its views for that of the agen-
cy.244 Previous decisions in which courts have deferred to the DOE’s exper-
tise in matters related to nuclear energy reflect this approach, which a court 
should likewise adopt in this case.245 
2. Uprate Eligibility Is Consistent with the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s 
Underlying Policy 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has determined that an agency’s ex-
pertise is worthy of deference when its interpretation is consistent with the 
underlying policy of the statute it is charged with administering.246 The 
DOE’s decision to include uprates to existing nuclear reactors among the 
projects eligible for Title XVII loan guarantees therefore deserves deference 
because awarding loan guarantees to such projects helps advance the goals 
Congress imputed to the Energy Policy Act of 2005.247 The DOE’s decision 
has important consequences in the context of halting global warming and 
climate change.248 The Act instructs the DOE to make loan guarantees to 
projects that further the policies embodied by its preamble and the two 
threshold requirements set forth in Title XVII, meaning projects that “accel-
erate the commercialization of innovative, environmentally-friendly tech-
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nologies that will support clean, affordable, and reliable supplies of ener-
gy.”249 By appropriating funds specifically for loan guarantees to projects 
using nuclear power, Congress has demonstrated its belief that the nuclear 
power industry is capable of putting forth projects that can help achieve this 
goal.250 The DOE has applied its expertise in proceeding to identify uprates 
as a particular type of project that can use innovative technology to produce 
electricity in a more environmentally friendly manner.251 
The agency has already established that using nuclear power to gener-
ate electricity “offers environmental benefits consistent with the statutory 
objectives of Title XVII” because doing so emits “considerably less” carbon 
dioxide than comparable coal or natural-gas-fired plants.252 Because uprates 
enable an existing reactor to produce even more electricity by increasing its 
capacity by as much as twenty percent, this type of project can reduce reli-
ance on coal and natural-gas-fired electric plants in the same way that other 
eligible projects—such as the new reactors at the Vogtle Plant—do.253 
Simply put, the more uprates that receive loan guarantees, the more electric-
ity that can be produced from comparatively cleaner sources of energy.254 
As of November 2015 the NRC reported four pending applications for up-
rates, with another seven expected to apply in 2017.255 With the cost of per-
forming an uprate ranging from hundreds of millions to several billion dol-
lars, the DOE presumably sees uprates as a category of eligible projects that 
are both costly enough to prompt reactor owners to apply for loan guaran-
tees, and effective enough in increasing the amount of electricity generated 
by environmentally friendly sources to be consistent with Title XVII.256 
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The fact that others may not share the agency’s view, and may in fact 
espouse alternative permissible constructions of the statute, is not necessari-
ly an indication that a court should refuse to defer to the agency.257 The 
Joint Commentators and the NEI have expressed conflicting opinions re-
garding the eligibility of uprates, yet as long as a court finds the DOE’s po-
sition to be rational and reasonable it need not be the “best” of all possible 
interpretations.258 In Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. National Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., the United States Supreme Court concluded: 
This view of the agency charged with administering the statute is 
entitled to considerable deference; and to sustain it, we need not 
find that it is the only permissible construction that [the agency] 
might have adopted but only that [the agency’s] understanding of 
this very “complex statute” is a sufficiently rational one to pre-
clude a court from substituting its judgment for that of [the agen-
cy].259 
As discussed above, the DOE’s interpretation of Title XVII is rational and 
reasonable, and therefore deserves deference despite the contrary interpreta-
tions put forth by the Joint Commentators and the NEI.260 
3. The DOE’s Decision to Include Uprates Carries the Force of Law 
Finally, the fact that the DOE issued the final version of its solicitation 
only after seeking public comment on its published draft reinforces the con-
clusion that the agency’s interpretation is worthy of Chevron deference.261 
In United States v. Mead Corp., the United States Supreme Court singled 
out agency interpretations that Congress expected to carry the force of law 
as “a category of interpretive choices distinguished by an additional reason 
for judicial deference.”262 Justice David Souter explained, “It is fair to as-
sume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the 
effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative proce-
dure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force.”263 The Court recognizes notice-and-
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comment rulemaking, of the type in which the DOE engaged with respect to 
its solicitation, as one of several such formal administrative procedures.264 
Congress has authorized the Energy Secretary to engage in formal 
rulemaking procedures.265 The agency’s decision to retain uprates among 
the types of projects it identified as eligible for Title XVII loan guarantees 
in its final solicitation, published following the receipt of comments from 
over thirty-five groups, constitutes an exercise of this delegated authority to 
which a court should defer.266 Judicial deference is warranted because Con-
gress intended for the DOE to exercise policymaking responsibilities, and it 
has done so here via an avenue that the Court has concluded carries the 
force of law.267 
CONCLUSION 
As the United States faces a future in which the demand for electricity 
is forecast to grow even as society and government take steps to halt global 
warming, it makes sense that alternatives to fossil fuels are becoming in-
creasingly attractive. Power plants that rely on nuclear energy rather than 
coal or natural gas have the ability to generate electricity without emitting 
any carbon dioxide, yet the cost to build and maintain them can be enor-
mous. Title XVII of Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the “Act”), which authoriz-
es the Secretary of the Department of Energy (“DOE”) to make loan guar-
antees for certain nuclear projects, can help encourage wider commercial 
use of new energy technology to benefit the environment. 
The DOE’s interpretation of the statute—which permits uprates to ex-
isting nuclear reactors to apply for loan guarantees—can provide financial 
assistance to projects that are less dramatic than the construction of brand 
new reactors yet still capable of benefitting the environment through in-
creased nuclear generation capacity. Critics stand ready to accuse the DOE 
of illegally funding nuclear projects should it extend a loan guarantee to an 
uprate project because they believe that such projects cannot satisfy the two 
threshold eligibility requirements of Title XVII. The DOE clearly believes, 
however, that there are uprates that can avoid, reduce, or sequester green-
house gases while employing new or significantly improved technology. 
For that reason, combined with Congress’s failure to address the eligibility 
of particular projects in the statute and the fact that the DOE’s interpretation 
is consistent with the underlying policy of the Act, a court should defer to 
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the DOE’s decision to include uprates to existing nuclear reactors among 
the projects that are eligible for Title XVII loan guarantees. 
  
 
